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Introduction
The location of a large …rm in a given jurisdiction can substantially increase its residents' welfare -by increasing employment, wages and tax revenue. Moreover, additional positive e¤ects on the economy may arise in the form of spillovers. It is therefore not surprising that municipal or regional governments are willing to o¤er tax concessions or outright subsidies to attract large …rms. Often these …nancial incentives are associated with some performance commitment in terms of investment, output or -in most casesemployment. These contractually …xed commitments may be interpreted as a consequence of incomplete information: An individual region is willing to bid for the …rm according to the surplus it creates -but the size of the surplus may a priori be unknown or, at least, only imprecisely measurable. By committing itself to some performance target, the …rm may signal its type and, thus, reduce the information asymmetry. The question arises, though, whether these commitments are generally welfare-enhancing.
In this paper, we consider a model with two regions which engage in a …rst-price sealed bid auction for a large …rm with unknown characteristics. These characteristics will ultimately determine the welfare gain from attracting the …rm. Welfare gains take the form of increased tax revenue, reduced unemployment and spillovers on tax revenue from other sources. Whereas the …rm's employment is controllable and ex-post veri…able, pro…ts (i.e. the corporate tax base) cannot be controlled due to stochastic shocks, but can be veri…ed ex-post. Spillovers can be neither controlled nor veri…ed. We consider direct non-linear mechanisms that induce truthful reporting of the …rm's type as well as simpler bidding strategies, under both symmetric and asymmetric competition.
We …nd that, …rst, as with complete information, the symmetric equilibrium under incomplete information generally yields zero expected regional payo¤s and full capture of the surplus by each …rm type. Second, in equilibrium o¤ers, payments and subsidies to the …rm are conditioned on employment levels (performance targets). Third, if spillovers vary with …rm type, equilibrium o¤ers generally induce employment distortions. If spillovers are larger for high employment types -which we …nd most plausible -, the equilibrium contract dictates ine¢ ciently high labor demand for the high employment types. In contrast, if spillovers are lower for high employment …rms, there will be underemployment. In the absence of type-dependent spillovers, the bidding outcome has the same e¢ ciency properties as under complete information; speci…cally, employment of each …rm type is at its …rst-best level. Fourth, in asymmetric settings (i.e. where pro…ts or spillovers are location-speci…c), situations may arise where regional payo¤s are larger than in the case of complete information. This is surprising, since the regions are the uninformed parties in this game. Finally, under incomplete information, a limitation of the set of policy instruments may enhance e¢ ciency. Speci…cally, we show that if regions cannot condition their bids on the …rm's performance (e.g. employment) but are restricted to lump-sum payments, simple tax rebates and employment subsidies, the …rst-best allocation prevails. Since regional payo¤s in the symmetric setting are zero in both cases, such a restriction of available instruments would imply a Pareto improvement with the …rm capturing the whole increase in payo¤s.
There is a large literature on regional competition for the location of …rms. 2 An important question in this literature is why the region wants to attract a …rm. In this paper, our answer to this question is tax revenue and jobs -like, for instance, Boadway, Cu¤ and Marceau (2002) -and spillovers, see e.g. Olsen and Osmundsen (2003) . However, we neglect the impact of …rm location on competition, see e.g. Hau ‡er and Wooton (1999), consumer surplus, see Becker and Fuest (2010) , and agglomeration economies, see e.g. Baldwin and Okubo (2009) . We also abstract from any considerations of industry structure. 3 The focus of this paper is on the role of incomplete information which has been considered by a number of predecessor studies. Bond and Samuelson (1986) assume that the region has more information on the location pro…tability than the …rm. Tax holidays may then act as a signal for the location quality. Private information on the side of the bidding governments is also considered in Furusawa, Hori and Wooton (2010) . 4 King, McAfee and Welling (1993) study the role of incomplete information when …rms may relocate and, thus, have an incentive to update their expectations of location-speci…c pro…ts. Black and Hoyt (1989) brie ‡y consider the case in which the …rm has private information on the cost di¤erences between regions. If cost parameters are di¤erent across regions, part of the surplus is region speci…c. This perspective is taken in Scoones and Wen (2001) who show that the degree of bidding competition decreases in the share of region 2 The tax sensitivity of …rm location has also been examined in a wide variety of studies which are surveyed by Devereux (2007) , Zodrow (2010) and Feld and Heckemeyer (2011) .
3 There is a literature strand of its own dealing with the analysis of heterogeneous …rms in the tradition of Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) . Chor (2009) , Davies and Eckel (2010) , Becker and Fuest (2011) as well as Hau ‡er and Stähler (2013) analyze optimal tax policy in the presence of heterogeneous mobile …rms. 4 A simple setting with two-sided private information is analyzed in King and Welling (1992) . speci…c surplus.
When the set of policy instruments to attract the …rm becomes more sophisticated, a region may use direct mechanisms that induce truth-telling about actual pro…ts and employment levels, building on Baron and Myerson (1982) . Osmundsen et al. (1998) consider a small country facing a passive world market that sets out to optimally tax …rms di¤ering in mobility. They show that, in equilibrium, investment is distorted downwards. In contrast, we consider two actively competing governments, as Osmundsen (2001, 2003) . These authors adopt a model from Haaparanta (1996) where the …rm may invest in both countries (and will do so because of the concavity of local production functions). They analyze tax competition for a …rm with private information on its productivity. The screening equilibrium implies a downward distortion of investment.
This common agency approach (see, e.g., Martimort and Stole, 2002 , for a general treatment) is di¤erent from the perspective taken in this paper. We consider regional competition for the exclusive location of a …rm (as in Biglaiser and Mezzetti, 1993) . The di¤erence is crucial. In the Osmundsen (2001, 2003) approach, a region e¤ectively competes for the marginal unit of capital, which often has a net social return of zero. In contrast, by assuming that the …rm either locates in this or the other region implies that all tax revenue, all employment and all spillovers is concentrated in the region that wins the bidding competition. This gives rise to Bertrandstyle competition and a race to the bottom. If however, part of the …rm always remains in one country, tax rates will never reach the bottom (due to the trade-o¤ between taxing intramarginal units and competing for marginal units). Correspondingly, we …nd that, in plausible cases, a direct truthinducing mechanism implies overemployment instead of underemployment (the latter of which corresponds to the underinvestment result of Osmundsen, 2001, 2003) . 5 From an empirical point of view, there is large and extensive evidence of …rm-speci…c state aids, subsidies or tax holidays, see e.g. Besley and Seabright (2001) . Policies to attract foreign …rms are anything but homogenous. In some cases, unconditional tax credits seem to be the main policy 5 Bierbrauer et al. (2013) analyze non-linear taxation of individuals with perfect labor mobility. Their framework is similar to ours with regard to two competing governments implementing direct mechanisms to let individual agents reveal their type. They …nd that, in most cases, redistribution (i.e. taxes and subsidies) do not survive perfect labor mobility -the equivalent …nding in our paper is that …rms receive the full surplus (at least in the symmetric setting). In contrast to their paper, we assume spillovers that create the incentive to distort the agent's decision (in our paper: employment).
instrument. For instance, in 2010, Michigan won over Ohio by attracting a new Chrysler assembly plant o¤ering the …rm a $1.3 billion state tax credit over 20 years. 6 More recently, the rental car service Hertz announced to move its headquarters to Florida in exchange of $16.8 million of immediate payments and tax credits worth $68 million over 20 years. 7 In other cases, tax rebates are associated with an incentive to employ domestic workers, as it was the case with Thyssen Krupp in 2007 (and later in 2011) investing in Mobile County (Alabama). 8 Moreover, governments sometimes …x speci…c investment and employment targets. For example, Boeing may only receive the full subsidy package with a total value of $900 million (o¤ered to it in 2009 to build a new aircraft plant in North Charleston) if some speci…c investment and jobs targets are met. 9 Another example is the case of Nokia, from which the State of Northrhine-Westfalia successfully claimed back 40 million e arguing that the …rm did not meet the employment targets. 10 In this paper, we rationalize this kind of contract and, with some interpretation, even the incentive to employ less people than contractually …xed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section outlays the model setup. Section 3 analyzes the bidding competition under symmetry assumptions. Section 4 examines di¤erent assumptions about asymmetry between the two competing regions. In Section 5, we analyze less sophisticated bidding strategies in which regional governments only have upfront payments, tax rebates and wage subsidies at their disposal. Section 6 discusses the results and concludes. 6 See Michigan Economic Development Corporation (October 26, 2010) . Available at http://www.michiganbusiness.org/press-releases/governor-granholm-announceshistoric-investment-in-michigan/.
7 See Lynn K., Hugh, R.M. and L. Moss (May 7, 2013 Consider a world with two regions, i = 1; 2, competing for a large …rm (the index will be suppressed as long as there is no misunderstanding). The …rm chooses the location which o¤ers the largest net payo¤s (including tax breaks, subsidies, upfront payments etc.). If payo¤s are equal in both regions, the large …rm is indi¤erent between both locations and chooses each region with equal probability. Once the …rm has chosen the location, it stays there. 11 The …rm is characterized by a parameter 2 fl; hg, which represents low (l) and high (h) productivity and is private information of the …rm (and cannot be credibly revealed). The ex-ante probabilities for the …rm characteristic are p l for the low-productivity type and p h 1 p l for the high-productivity type. These probabilities are common knowledge. The …rm employs labor, N , as the only input good. Its pre-tax pro…ts, , are given by
where " "( ) is a type-dependent stochastic shock and F (N ) F ( ; N ). Pro…t maximization requires @F (N )=@N = w. We will denote the pro…t-maximizing level of a …rm with type by N and the respective pre-tax pro…ts by ( ; N ). We will assume that, at each employment level, the marginal labor productivity is higher for the h-type than for the ltype, i.e. @F h (N )=@N > @F l (N )=@N for all N . This implies that, for all environments considered here, pro…t maximizing employment is strictly higher in an h-type …rm than in an l-type …rm. Moreover, we assume that h-type has weakly larger maximum pro…ts. 12 In each of the two regions there is a large number of immobile households, normalized to unity. Each household supplies one unit of labor and receives labor income of w. Unemployed households receive a social transfer of w s from the government. Household k 0 s utility function is given by
where c k 2 fw; w s g is consumption, I k is a binary variable that is one if the household works and zero if the household does not work but receives social transfers, and g is a public good. Perfect competition on the labor market adjusts wages w until all households have the same utility, v (w; 1) = v (w s ; 0), and utility can be denoted by u (g).
The government is assumed to be benevolent. It collects tax revenue, provides the public good and pays the social transfer to all unemployed households. Tax revenue from other sources is given by R. Let R 0 denote the level of these revenues if the …rm is not attracted.
The …rm location may have spillovers which depend, by assumption, on the …rm type, but not directly on the level of employment. For simplicity, we assume that spillovers only a¤ect the government's revenues from other sources. Thus, these revenues are R after location of a …rm of type , where R R R 0 and R l R R h .
We assume that tax revenue can be transformed into the public good on a one-to-one basis. Then, the government's budget constraint in the absence of the large …rm is given by
If the large …rm is attracted and realizes an employment level N , the government's budget constraint becomes
where t is the statutory regional corporate tax rate and T is the upfront payment to the …rm of type . Thus, if T = 0, the regional payo¤ from attracting the …rm is given by
where the right hand side represents the maximum level of T that the region is willing to o¤er. There are, thus, three reasons why a region desires to attract the …rm. First, a reduction in unemployment, which here means saving of unemployment bene…ts (…rst term on the right hand side in (5)). The …rm's employment level can directly be controlled by the …rm and it can be veri…ed ex-post. Second, tax revenue, i.e. a share of the …rm's pro…ts (second term). Pro…ts cannot be directly controlled, as they are stochastic, but may be veri…ed ex-post. Third, the spillover, R R 0 , which can neither be controlled nor be veri…ed ex-post (third term). As the following analysis will show, none of these three elements is redundant.
In the absence of any policy intervention, the …rm sets the pro…t-maximizing level of employment, implied by
Since an additional unit of employment saves the region expenditures on unemployment bene…ts, the socially optimal employment level is larger than that. It is straightfor-ward to show that …rst-best employment implies @F (N ) @N = w w s . 13 Let N denote the socially optimal employment level and ( ; N ) the respective pro…ts for a …rm of type .
The timing of the model is as follows: First, a …rst price sealed bid auction takes place in which both regions simultaneously submit their o¤ers for the …rm. Second, the …rm decides where to locate and chooses its labor demand. Finally, governments'revenues and …rms'pro…ts are realized.
Symmetric bidding competition
In this section, we consider regional competition for a …rm between two identical regions. That is, both regions have the same tax rates, same unemployed transfers w s and so on. Asymmetries are considered in section 4.
In the following, we will consider three direct mechanisms. The …rst one, in subsection 3.1, assumes that pro…ts cannot be contracted upon. This means that the contract between the region and the …rm takes the form of an employment target (which has to be met by the …rm) and an upfront lump-sum payment. The region, thus, does not make use of the fact that pro…ts can be veri…ed ex-post.
The second mechanism, in subsection 3.2, allows for tax rebates which can be interpreted as a simple way of conditioning payments on pro…ts. That is, for a given tax rate, the more pro…ts the …rm has, the higher the value of the tax rebate. We do believe that this is the most plausible setting as we actually observe contracts that include this kind of simple pro…t conditions, but not more sophisticated ones.
For the sake of analytical completeness, we consider a third mechanism in subsection 3.3 in which we allow for sophisticated conditions based upon pro…ts. We are not aware that this kind of contract exists in the real world, although -as we will show -it has powerful advantages. 14 1 3 To see this, assume that the government may set N while adjusting T such that
Of course, this raises the question, why pro…ts are not conditioned upon in the real world. Note that simple volatility due to stochastic shocks would not be a su¢ cient reason since this should not be a problem for risk-neutral …rms and governments. It may, however, be that pro…ts are received with varying time lags which makes contracting upon them undesirable. We defer this question to later research.
A direct mechanism conditioning on employment
Assume that pro…ts and spillovers cannot be contracted upon. A direct mechanism 15 conditioning on employment means that the region may o¤er a menu of contracts taking the form of N ;T whereN denotes the employment level that leads to a payment ofT . Equivalently, the region may ask the …rm to reveal its type and then assigns a contract N~ ;T~ wherê N~ andT~ denote the employment level and the payment in case of a report of type (~ denotes the reported type).
Truthful revelation of the …rm type requires that the h-type has no incentive to mimick the l-type and vice versa. These requirements are summarized in the two following incentive compatibility constraints (ICC h ) and (ICC l ):
We can now state the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. In any truth-telling symmetric (pure-strategy) bidding equilibrium (i) the employment level o¤ ered to the h-type is at least as high as the level o¤ ered to the l-type,N h N l , (ii) both regions are indi¤ erent between attracting the …rm and not, and (iii) each type of …rm gets its full surplus.
(ii) If the regions' bids imply positive expected payo¤s from attracting the …rm, a region can attract all types of …rms with certainty by increasing its bids by ". (iii) Part (ii) implies that, if one …rm type receives less than the full surplus, the other type receives more than that. Then, a region can increase its expected payo¤s by o¤ering only the contract that yields positive pro…ts. Thus, a separating contract with cross-subsidization cannot be an equilibrium o¤er. It remains to show that there is no pooling equilibrium. First note that a pooling o¤er with an employment level below N l or above N h is not sustainable. A pooling o¤er with employment between N l or above N h means that at least one type's employment is distorted. A region can now o¤er a contract with an employment level closer to one …rm's desired level of employment while adjusting the payment T~ such that this type stays indi¤erent. Since the other …rm type's employment would be distorted even more, it would always prefer the other region's pooling o¤er. Thus, a region can always make a pro…table deviation from a pooling o¤er. It can therefore not be an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 summarizes the characteristics of the symmetric separating equilibrium in pure strategies, given Lemma 1.
Proposition 1 (Conditioning on employment) . Let R and R denote two thresholds for the di¤ erence in spillovers,
R, any symmetric separating equilibrium in pure strategies requires e¢ cient emplyoment levels for both types, i.e.
Proof : With e¢ cient employment levels, i.e.N h = N h andN l = N l , and full surplus capture by the two …rm types, (ICC h ) and (
(i) With R > R, it follows that if R R h R l R, there is a symmetric equilibrium with e¢ cient employment. (ii) If R h R l > R, (ICC l ) is violated at e¢ cient employment levels, whereas (ICC h ) is not binding. As the right hand side of (7) increases inN h , it is optimal to set the e¢ cient employment level for the l-type and increaseN h beyond the e¢ cient level. (iii) If R h R l < R, the (ICC h ) is violated at e¢ cient employment levels. It is now optimal to reduceN l such thatN l < N l while keepingN h at its e¢ cient level,N h = N h .
The contracts described in Proposition 1 can be implemented in the following way: All …rms get an employment subsidy of ! N~ which is a function of employment. If R R h R l R, the slope of this subsidy function equals w s in the vicinity of N l and N h . If R h R l > R, the slope of the function is greater as w s in the vicinity ofN h > N h . Finally, if R h R l < R, the slope equals w s in the vicinity of N h and is lower then w s aroundN l < N l . Moreover, total subsidy payments should equal R R 0 + t (N ) + w sN with 2 fl; hg.
Proposition 1 characterizes a symmetric separating equilibrium for di¤er-ent environments -in case that it exists. There may be, however, situations in which an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist, like in the insurance markets model by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . To see this, consider a situation in which both types are o¤ered a contract which makes them capture the full surplus. However, due to distorted labor demand, a deviation is feasible that o¤ers the distorted type a more e¢ cient labor demand while making sure (by reducingT ) that the non-distorted …rm type's ICC holds with equality.
Proposition 2 de…nes conditions for the existence of these equilibria.
Proof: (i) If R R h R l R, both types' employment levels are e¢ cient, and both types capture the full surplus. Since this is the …rst-best, a pro…table deviation is not feasible. (ii) Assume a situation in which the region o¤ers a contract (N l ; T l ) and some contract (N h ;T h ). The latter ensures that the (ICC l ) holds with equality, but it may yield non-zero expected pro…ts for the region, denoted by X p h t h (N h ) + w sN h + R h R 0 T h . By increasing both bids by X, the zero pro…t condition is restored. For the (ICC l ) to hold with equality, a variation ofN h andT h must satisfy
Starting withN h = N h , a small increase inN h (and an increase inT h according to (8)) increases the …rm's pro…ts if
there is no equilibrium in pure strategies as Lemma 1 is violated). IfN h is further increased, X will eventually become zero. If this happens in a range where the h-type's pro…ts still increase inN h , then this is an equilibrium. However, if the h-type's pro…ts reach a maximum before the region's pro…ts are zero, then no equilibrium in pure strategies exists (as Lemma 1 is violated). The …rm's pro…ts are maximized atN 0 h implied by p h F 0
In contrast, the level ofN h which makes X become zero does not depend on p h . This proves part (ii) of the Proposition. (iii) The proof is equivalent to the one in (ii). Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . If the probability of being an l-type is too low, separating becomes too expensive for the h-type. In this case, there is a pooling contract (but not an equilibrium) in which both types are better o¤ than in the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 part (ii), and the region o¤ering such a contract earns positive revenues. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) prove for the Rothschild-Stiglitz model the existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies where the result is directly applicable here. The symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies has the same properties as the equilibrium in pure strategies. The government realizes zero expected pro…ts, there is overemployment if R h R l > R and underemployment if R h R l < R. Other approaches of dealing with the non-existence of equilibrium in a Rothschild-Stiglitz framework can be found in Wilson (1977) and Riley (1979) . Wilson (1977) introduces the concept of an anticipatory equilibrium in which governments are allowed to withdraw contracts when they realize that these contracts imply negative revenues (given the other government's bid). Applied to the framework here, if the equilibrium in Proposition 1 does not exist, the anticipatory equilibrium pools both types of …rms and implies zero-pro…ts for the governments. If the equilibrium in Proposition 1 exists, it is also a Wilson equilibrium. In contrast, the concept of a reactive equilibrium by Riley (1979) allows the governments to react to unpro…table situations by adding new contracts. With this equilibrium concept the separating equilibrium described in Proposition 1 exists independently of the ex-ante fractions of both types of …rms. In general, if a Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium does not exist, an equilibrium can only be ensured by extending the governments' scope of action and, therefore, by changing the structure of the game. The characteristics of the equilibrium bidding contracts then depend on the speci…c equilibrium concept underlying the analysis. In the following, we will assume that an equilibriumn exists.
Proposition 2 part (ii) is in line with

A direct mechanism conditioning on employment with simple tax rebates
The analysis in the previous subsection and the results in Proposition 1 do not take into account that the region can make use of the fact that pro…ts are veri…able ex-post. Why should that be important? Risk-neutral …rms can be assumed to be indi¤erent between receiving ex-post their actual tax payments (this is what a tax rebate is) or receiving ex-ante the expected tax payments. However, the choice between refunding actual or expected tax payments may a¤ect the incentive compatibility constraints. On the one hand, the o¤er of expected tax payments of the h-type is more attractive to the ltype than an actual tax rebate (since l-type pro…ts are lower in expected terms). On the other hand, o¤ering expected tax payments of the l-type is less attractive to the h-type than actual tax rebates. Thus, if the (ICC l ) for the low-productivity type is binding, the regions will o¤er actual tax payments. If the (ICC h ) is binding, o¤ering repayment of expected tax payment relaxes the constraint compared to actual tax payments.
We can therefore state the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 (conditioning on employment with ex-post veri…able profits). Assume that pro…ts are veri…able ex-post. Then, Prop. 1 applies with R 0 instead of R, with R 0 > R. O¤ ering rebates instead of upfront repayment of expected tax payments increases e¢ ciency. All e¢ ciency gains are captured by the h-type …rm.
Proof : With refunding of actual tax payments, (ICC l ) reads
and the modi…ed version of (7)
With R 0 > R, the range in which …rst-best employment levels are o¤ered is broadened. With Lemma 1, it follows that the resulting e¢ ciency gains are completely captured by the h-type …rm (the l-type …rm is nondistorted anyway).
With R 0 > 0 and R < 0, we can now state the following Corollary.
Corollary 1. With R h R l = 0, i.e. no or no type-dependent spillovers, o¤ ers imply …rst-best employment.
The contracts described in Proposition 1 can be implemented as described in the previous section with the exception of when R h R l > R. Then, all …rms are exempted from corporate taxation and get an employment subsidy of ! N~ which is a function of employment. The slope of this subsidy function equals w s in the vicinity of N l and is greater as w s in the vicinity ofN h > N h . Moreover, total subsidy payments should equal R R 0 + w sN for 2 fl; hg.
A direct mechanism conditioning on employment and pro…ts
Now, we consider a mechanism that allows for non-linear conditioning on pro…ts. For this purpose, we assume that pro…ts cannot be exaggerated, i.e. the realized maximum pro…t is , but easily reduced (just by not selling part of the product). Let~ 2 [ 1; ] denote the feasible pro…t levels of a …rm of type . Note that expected pro…ts cannot be veri…ed, only actual pro…ts can. Therefore, a mechanism can only condition on realized pro…ts, . Since actual pro…ts may exceed expected pro…ts, an l-type …rm may have the incentive to speculate on higher actual pro…ts which signal an htype …rm. By o¤ering type-dependent payment functions,T~ N~ ;~ , that condition on actual pro…ts~ , a region may set the incentive to truthfully report the …rm type. LetT~ N~ ;~ denote the payment to a …rm that has reported to be type~ and has actual pro…ts of~ . For the …rm to truthfully report its actual pro…ts, the payment fucntion T~ N~ ;~ has to satisfy the property
i.e. the payment function can at most eliminate the impact of actual pro…ts on the …rm's payo¤. The incentive compatibility constraints are given by
where e (N~ ) denotes the expected pro…t of a …rm with type reporting type~ andT ẽ (N~ ;~ ) denotes the respective payment.
We can now state the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 (Conditioning on pro…ts). Let R 0 < 0 denote a threshold for the di¤ erence in spillovers, R h R l . With conditioning on employment and pro…ts, a fully separating equilibrium where both …rm types receive their full surplus and employment is at its …rst-best level is feasible if R h R l > R 0 . Otherwise, the region's government optimally o¤ ers contracts that condition only on employment and Proposition 1 applies.
Proof : First, as before, if (ICC 0 h ) and (ICC 0 l ) hold at e¢ cient employment levels, then the …rst-best equilibrium can be attained. Second, if only (ICC 0 l ) is binding, then governments setN h = N h since there is no need to distort labor demand. The reason is that additional payments to the htype can now be conditioned upon large pro…ts that cannot be mimicked by the l-type. Third, if (ICC 0 h ) is the binding constraint, the region's government has to account for an additional constraint, since the high-productive type can understate its pro…ts. This puts some bounds on the payment
which is the discrete version of (9) in expected terms. ReplacingT e h (N h ;~ h ) byT h and
For R h R l < R 0 , conditioning on pro…ts is useless because the h-type can easily mimick the pro…t levels of the l-type.
The above Proposition implies that conditioning on pro…ts would eliminate the case of overemployment. To understand this, it is helpful to recall why there might be overemployment in the case where only employment can be conditioned upon. This case occurs if the h-type has larger spillovers than the l-type. Since spillovers imply a certain willingness to pay, this means that the region is ready to o¤er more for the h-type. Since a more attractive o¤er is prone to mimicking, the labor demand is distorted in order to push back the l-types pretending to be h-types. If pro…ts can be conditioned upon, there is no need to distort employment. By 'subsidizing'pro…ts, the h-type o¤er is improved without changing behavior (…rms maximize pro…ts anyway).
With regard to implementation, a crucial di¤erence compared to the previous subsections only occurs for R h R l > R. Then, …rms could get an employment subsidy of w s . In addition, a negative tax is paid such that the expected payment to the …rm equals R R 0 +t (N ) with 2 fl; hg.
Asymmetric bidding competition
So far we considered perfectly symmetric competition. Now, we allow for asymmetries, i.e. di¤erences between the countries that may a¤ect the properties of the bidding equilibrium. For simplicity reasons, we will only focus on the case of R h R l , i.e. where spillovers are equal across types or the high-productivity …rm has higher spillovers. Results for R h < R l can be derived analogously.
Location-speci…c pro…t
The …rst type of asymmetry we consider here concerns location-speci…c profits. In section 3, we assumed that, in the absence of regional bids, the …rm is indi¤erent between the regions. In the real world, this will rarely be the case. Now, we consider the case in which the …rm has a higher pro…t in region 1 and would, thus, prefer region 1 in the absence of a bidding competition. The pre-tax pro…t di¤erence is assumed to equal ( ) which may depend on , (h) 7 (l). Each of the following results does not depend on whether simple tax rebates are available (as in subsection 3.2) or not (subsection 3.1).
Proposition 5. Assume that the …rm's pre-tax pro…t is larger in region 1 and R h R l . Region 2 makes the o¤ er described in Propositions 1 and 3. With denoting a small payment, region 1'sT l is reduced by (l) , thus attracting type l with certainty. In comparison to the o¤ er described in Propositions 1 and 3, region 1 changes the o¤ er to type h as follows:
, employment distortions are aggravated andT h is reduced by less than (h) .
Proof : (i) If (h) = (l), the ICCs are not a¤ected. Reducing the o¤er by ( ) makes the …rm indi¤erent, adding an provides a su¢ cient incentive to choose region 1.
(ii) With (h) > (l), the o¤er to the h-type can be reduced more than to the l-type. This relaxes the ICC l . This allows region 1 to reduce the labor demand distortion in the o¤er to the h-type. The resulting e¢ ciency gain is captured by the region. (iii) Analogously, (h) < (l) makes the ICC l more restrictive which requires further distortions of the h-type's labor demand. To make the h-type choose region 1, the o¤er has to be reduced by less than (h) . Part (ii) of the above Proposition describes a case in which the region can bene…t by more than the total value of the location-speci…c pro…t. Compared to the case of complete information, the region gains from the incompleteness of information. The reason is that region 1 competes with a region that o¤ers an employment-distorting contract. In this regard, competition is weaker under incomplete information.
An example of a location-speci…c pro…t may be the case in which region 1 has lower wages due to a lower disutility of work. For the sake of the argument, assume that unemployment bene…ts are equal in both regions, w s 1 = w s 2 ; then, a lower disutility of work implies w 1 < w 2 . In fact, labor cost is in the centre focus of the debate on multinational …rms'location choices. From the viewpoint of the …rm, lower labor costs are only important if they translate into higher pro…ts. The gain from lower wages will depend on the size of emplyoment and, thus, on the …rm type . We can therefore state the following.
Corollary 2. Assume that w s 1 = w s 2 and w 1 < w 2 . Then, the …rm has a higher pro…t in region 1 which depends on and can be expressed as ( ). Proposition 5 applies.
Whether ( ) depends positively or negatively on in this case depends on the shape of the production function F ( ).
Location-speci…c spillover
Now assume that the spillover is location-speci…c and depends on the …rm type . Let R ( ) denote the location-speci…c spillover. Location-speci…c spillovers may, for instance, be explained by a location-speci…c industry structure. From the viewpoint of region 1, an additional positive spillover does not need to change the bidding strategy since the region only needs to match the o¤er by region 2. However, if the additional spillover is negative, the maximum o¤er by region 1 is reduced. Accordingly the whole equilibrium changes. Each of the following results does not depend on whether simple tax rebates are available (as in subsection 3.2) or not (subsection 3.1).
Proposition 6. Assume that spillovers from …rm location are di¤ erent in region 1 and R h R l . If R ( ) > 0, the contracts o¤ ered are those described in Propositions 1 and 3, but region 1 may attract the …rm with certainty by increasing the lump-sum payments by a small payment . If R ( ) < 0, region 1'sT l is reduced by R (l). Region 1's o¤ er to type h is changed as follows:
, employment distortions are mitigated andT h is reduced by at most R (h). The e¢ -ciency gain is entirely captured by the h-type …rm (i.e. its payo¤ s decrease by less than
, employment distortions are aggravated andT h is reduced by at least R (h). The e¢ ciency loss is entirely born by the h-type …rm (i.e. its payo¤ s decrease by more than R (h)).
Region 2 matches the o¤ er adding and attracts the …rm with certainty.
Proof : With R ( ) > 0, region 1 has a higher willingness to pay for the …rm and may therefore attract the …rm by slightly increasing its o¤ers, compared to the case described in Propositions 1 and 3. With R ( ) < 0, region 1 has to reduce its o¤ers (otherwise it could increase payo¤s by not bidding at all). (i) If R (h) = R (l), payments accounting for locationspeci…c spillovers do not a¤ect the ICCs. However, to avoid losses region 1 has to decrease its payments by R ( ). Region 2 can attract the …rms by bidding slightly more than region 1 does. (ii) With R (h) < R (l), the ICC l with region 1's maximum bids is relaxed, i.e. implies no or smaller labor demand distortions. With region 1 bidding the full surplus and region 2 matching the o¤er (adding only ), the resulting e¢ ciency gain is captured by the …rm. (iii) With R (h) > R (l), the ICC l with region 1's maximum bids tightens which implies larger labor market distortion (provided that ICC l has been binding with R ( ) = 0, otherwise labor demand may still be undistorted). Again, with region 1 bidding the (now smaller) surplus and region 2 matching the o¤er, the resulting e¢ ciency loss is born by the …rm.
An example for a location-speci…c spillover is when the workers in region 1 have a lower disutility of work, but wages are equal in both countries, i.e. w s 1 > w s 2 and w 1 = w 2 . Then, attracting the …rm in region 1 implies higher savings of unemployment bene…ts than in region 2.
Corollary 3. Assume that w s 1 > w s 2 and w 1 = w 2 . Then, the location speci…c spillover in region 1 equals (w s 1 w s 2 )N > 0 and is positively depending on . Thus, Proposition 6 applies.
As another example, consider the case in which the workers'disutility of work is equal in both regions, but social security is less generous in region 1, i.e. w s 1 < w s 2 . The lower unemployment bene…ts represents a negative location-speci…c spillover. However, with equal disutility of work, a lower w s translates into lower equilibrium wages, which represents a location-speci…c pro…t. For simplicity, we assume that w 1 w 2 = w s 1 w s 2 which requires linearity in the labor argument in the utility function. Then, the labor cost in the bidding equilibrium is equal in both regions. Thus, di¤erences in social security do not a¤ect the bidding equilibrium described in Propositions 1 and 3. Thus, regions with lower wages and lower unemployment bene…ts are not more likely to attract the …rm. 16 
Simpler bidding strategies
One may have doubts about the assumption that real world governments are willing or able to implement subtle mechanisms as the ones described above. Since we feel unable to make a …nal call on this question, we complement the analysis by considering simpler bidding strategies.
The probably simplest bidding strategy -regions o¤ering unconditional upfront transfers -yields a straightforward equilibrium: The …rm receives an o¤er equal to the sum of expected tax revenue, employment gains and spillovers. Firm types are thus pooled which bene…ts the low-pro…t and low-employment …rms.
In the following, we will consider a slightly more complicated bidding strategy. We assume that regions can o¤er lump-sum payments T , tax breaks, 2 [0; t], and employment subsidies, ! 2 R, none of which can be made type-dependent. 17 A bid has therefore the form of a triple (T; ; !) and …rm pro…ts are (1 t + ) (F (N ) wN ) + !N + T . Employment is then implied by F 0 (N ) = w ! 1 t+ . Proposition 7. Assume that governments can only make type-dependent o¤ ers taking the form (T; ; !). In equilibrium, regions have zero expected payo¤ s. The subsidy equals ! = (1 t + ) w s and employment is e¢ cient. The tax rebate is chosen as follows:
The lump-sum payment T is given by
Proof : Any bidding equilibrium requires zero expected revenues for the government. Otherwise one region could increase its bid by and attract the …rm with certainty. Similarly, any bidding equilibrium requires ! = (1 t + ) w s . Otherwise one region could set ! = (1 t + ) w s , thus maximizing the surplus, and reduce the lump-sum payment and increase its payo¤s. Then, zero expected pro…ts imply T = p l ((t ) l + R l ) + p h ((t ) h + R h ). Cross-subsidization occurs if (t ) l +R l 6 = (t ) h + R h . With ! …xed, and T are chosen to minimize cross-subsidization. The region sets such that the di¤erence is minimized which yields the rule in the Proposition.
The …rm is better o¤ when the regions'governments are not able to implement sophisticated mechanisms. This is stated in the following Corollary.
Corollary 5. Under symmetry, restricting the governments' sets of policy instruments to lump-sum payments, wage subsidies and tax rebates represents a Pareto improvement.
Proof : Under symmetry, the regions' payo¤s are zero independent of the set of instruments. Since employment is at its …rst-best level with a constrained set of instruments, the …rm's pro…ts are (weakly) larger in this setting.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper focusses on the role of incomplete information for the bidding behavior of regions. Incomplete information may explain some of the typical features of real-world bidding contests like (contractually …xed) performance targets on investment and employment. In plausible cases, these targets imply an ine¢ ciently high level of employment. Our model may thus explain why sometimes (e.g. in the case of Nokia, see the Introduction) a …rm may have an ex-post incentive to employ not as many workers as it originally agreed upon. More generally speaking, the overemployment result implies that both parties, the regional government and the …rm, have an incentive to renegotiate the contract as the joint surplus can be increased. However, for these contracts to work as a separating device, renegotiations have to be (credibly) ruled out. Another implication is that, in some of the above analyzed cases, incomplete information actually bene…ts the regional governments. The reason is that, if the two competitors o¤er contracts with ine¢ ciently high employment levels, the government that o¤ers the less distortionary employment target (due to some asymmetry like location-speci…c pro…t) captures the e¢ ciency gain. This highlights the role of information for the evaluation of interjurisdictional competition.
One important …nding is that, in the absence of type-dependent spillovers, full tax rebate and a simple wage subsidy are su¢ cient to induce the …rst-best allocation. The question arises why countries often use upfront payments instead of simple tax rebates. A potential answer is given by Bond and Samuelson (1986) who argue that governments may have better information on their regions pro…tability. Then, simply o¤ering a tax rebate and an employment subsidy may not be enough to convince the …rm that the location is of high quality. An upfront payment may act as a signal for the (expected) pro…ts that the …rm can earn in the region under consideration. 18 Finally, the question may arise how the results would change if more than two regions compete for the …rm. In the cases where the …rm receives the full surplus (at least in expected terms), the properties of the equilibrium would not change since a third competitor cannot o¤er a better bid (as long as we abstract from asymmetries). However, in the cases in which asymmetries imply a non-zero gain for the regional governments, market entry would erode these gains if the entrants are more similar to the winning region.
